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Abstract
We present a formal policy language (C2L) for stating permissible cloud conﬁgurations. Syntactically, C2L is based
upon a spatio-temporal modal logic and provides a concise and clear statement of policy constraints for colocation,
hosting, migration, security, and availability. We illustrate the language with a number of policy speciﬁcation examples
and also present an algorithm for verifying whether a cloud conﬁguration along with its history satisﬁes a C2L policy
speciﬁcation. We provide complexity analysis of the algorithm, and conclude that C2L is a useful and viable formalism
for specifying and verifying cloud conﬁguration policies.
c© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing [1] is regarded as one of the most important technology trends, owing to its wide
applicability from business computing to social networking to web-based email services. One of the key
characteristics of cloud computing is elasticity [2], i.e., the ability to dynamically allocate resources as
computing needs arise. Physical machines may be dynamically allocated to virtual machines (VMs) which
in turn may be migrated to other physical machines in case of machine faults. While this kind of ﬂexibility
increases availability and reduces cost, the highly dynamic nature in which VMs are allocated and migrated
raises security concerns [2]. For example, since data is subject to the local laws where the data is being
held1, migrating a VM to a data center residing in a region with weak privacy laws could be undesirable.
We consider the problem of specifying security policies regarding the location and migration of virtual
machines in a cloud computing system. Towards this end, we need a policy language in which we may
express policy statements. A client would use this language for specifying policies and the cloud provider
would implement the policies stated in this language. A set of policy statements essentially would restrict
the set of allowable cloud conﬁgurations. We want the policy statements to capture the security requirements
and also be abstract, i.e., not dependent on the speciﬁc cloud architectures of any particular provider.
∗Correponsing author. Email: jayaraj@am.amrita.edu
1http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/
2010/01/12/235782/Top-ﬁve-cloud-computing-security-issues.htm
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We propose a policy language, named C2L (short for Cloud Conﬁguration Logic) for specifying location
and migration policies of VMs in a cloud system. Our policy language is essentially a spatio-temporal
logic, i.e., a logic that has both spatial and temporal operators, and its syntax is loosely based on Cardelli
and Gordon’s modal logic for mobile ambients [3] (hereafter: mobile ambient logic). Both C2L and the
mobile ambient logic are essentially logics for dynamically evolving tree structures [4] and both support the
‘somewhere’ modality and spatial location. Organizing space as a tree structure is appropriate since cloud
conﬁgurations have a hierarchic structure. A logic-based language oﬀers the beneﬁts of supporting rigorous
reasoning. For instance, given a policy requirement by the client Q, and the policy oﬀered by the cloud
provider P, the client’s policy requirement is satisﬁed by the provider if P⇒ Q.
There is a fundamental diﬀerence between the temporal component of our spatio-temporal logic and
traditional temporal logics for specifying properties of concurrent systems. Traditionally, temporal logics
specify properties that should be satisﬁed by a given program, which eﬀectively speciﬁes all possible be-
haviors (as transition structures). Thus, traditional temporal logics have operators such as  (always) and
♦ (eventually) that specify properties about future behaviors. In contrast, in the context of cloud conﬁgura-
tions, there is no program or script that a priori speciﬁes future behaviors; instead, we only have available
the past history of cloud conﬁgurations that have occurred. Hence, the temporal component of our spatio-
temporal logic for cloud conﬁguration policies makes use of past operators:  (always in the past), 
(sometime in the past), and  (in the previous state). The absence of future temporal operators for policy
speciﬁcation is not a limitation in our context because any proposed action that potentially changes the cloud
conﬁguration will be commited to only if the resulting execution history satisﬁes the speciﬁed policies.
Our cloud conﬁguration policy language, C2L facilitates a clear and simple statement of policy con-
straints for colocation, hosting, migration, security, and availability. We brieﬂy survey several closely re-
lated logics and languages that have recently appeared in the literature and compare them with our approach.
In [5], a spatio-temporal logic called mobile TLA (MTLA) is proposed, based on Lamport’s temporal logic
of actions (TLA) [6]. MTLA is targeted towards speciﬁcation and reﬁnement of mobile systems and is
not suitable as a policy language for cloud conﬁguration systems. Unlike C2L, MTLA does not have past
operators which are required for specifying cloud conﬁguration policies. Mobile ambient logic is a logic
for specifying properties of mobile ambients [7] – a form of process algebra [8]. Process algebra have been
used to study security policies, e.g., CSP is proposed as a language to reason about XACML policies [9].
The C2L language allows speciﬁcation of multi-level security policies. Formal multi-level security mod-
els have been proposed for cloud computing [10]. The XPath language [11] supports queries over tree-
structured XML documents that are similar to hierarchically arranged spatial objects. However, XPath is
not a logic system and does not support temporal concepts. TXPath [12] extends XPath with queries on
temporal XML documents, i.e., documents having time interval information along their paths. Similar to
XPath, TXPath is also not based on logic and does not support temporal operators. Both languages also
do not have typed quantiﬁcations over subtrees, a key source of expressivity in C2L . A survey of policy
languages for network management as well as security management is given in [13]. These languages, how-
ever, are more oriented to the speciﬁcation of service-level agreements or access control polices, in contrast
with C2L which is more suited to specifying location and migration policies of cloud systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the concept of cloud conﬁgurations;
section 3 gives a brief background on spatio-temporal modal logics and presents the syntax of C2L with
examples; section 4 proposes an algorithm for verifying policies speciﬁed in C2L and analyzes its time
complexity; and section 5 presents conclusions and areas of future work.
2. Cloud Conﬁgurations
A cloud conﬁguration is a tree of objects that reﬂects the spatial arrangement of cloud components.
Figure 1 shows a fragment of a cloud conﬁguration tree with two regions regA and regB. The region regA is
composed of two zones, zoneA and zoneB. The zone zoneB contains two physical machines mc1 and mc2.
The machine mc2 in turn hosts two VMs, vm1 and vm2, and vm2 hosts two services.
A cloud conﬁguration evolves as a result of VMs being created, migrated, and terminated; this evolution
is depicted in Figure 1. At one extreme, if we pre-determine the conﬁguration we get traditional computing.
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At the other extreme, we may allow cloud conﬁgurations to freely evolve resulting in potentially insecure
cloud conﬁgurations. Eﬀectively, cloud policies ensure that cloud conﬁgurations evolve in a safe manner.
Fig. 1. A cloud conﬁguration tree and evolution of its subtree.
We present below some example policy statements for restricting cloud conﬁgurations:
1. Company c1’s and c2’s VMs must never be colocated.
2. Company c1’s VM must never get hosted in region A.
3. Company c1’s VMs must be hosted in at least two availability zones.
4. Security level of VMs must match that of the zones.
5. All regions must have a high-availability zone.
6. All zones in region regA must have at least one VM of company c1.
7. VMs must not be migrated across regions.
In addition to the graphical representation of conﬁguration trees, we may also wish to represent the tree
in a convenient textual form. Hence we use the following notation:
(a) n:T[A], which refers to a node n with type T and A as its subtree;
(b) A | B, which refers to spatially colocated subtrees A and B.
Following the above notation, the zoneB subtree appearing on the left-hand-side in Figure 1 may be repre-
sented textually as follows:
zoneB:Zone[mc1:PM | mc2:PM[vm1:VM | vm2:VM[svc1:Svc | svc2:Svc] ] ]
Each node in the above conﬁguration description has a name and a basic type. For instance, nodes
representing virtual machines have basic type VM; nodes representing physical machines have basic type
PM; nodes representing regions have basic type Region; and nodes representing zones have basic type Zone.
The names of all nodes are assumed to be unique in a given conﬁguration tree. The root node is unnamed.
Apart from the information regarding the name and the basic type of a node, we may wish to add attribute
information to a node , e.g., company name could be an attribute for any node of type VM. These attributes
could be stored as a set of name-value pairs along with the type information. We could view the basic type
along with the set of attribute-value pairs as the node type. This may be represented using the notation:
• n:T{a1=v1,...,ak=vk}[A]: The node n has node type T{a1=v1,...,ak=vk}, where T is a basic type and
aj=v j is an attribute-value pair.
For example, a node with basic type VM and with attribute-value pair co=co1 (i.e, company name is
co1) could be seen as having the node type VM{co=co1}, as given below.
vm2:VM{co=co1}[svc1:Svc | svc2:Svc]
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The node typing also induces a natural subtyping relation. Given two node types T1 and T2 having the
same basic type, we may say that T2 is a subtype of T1 if the attribute-value set of T2 is more speciﬁc than
the attribute-value set of T1, i.e., attribute-value set of T1 ⊆ attribute-value set of T2 (an unspeciﬁed attribute
is allowed to take any value).
3. A Logical Language for Cloud Conﬁguration
A modal logic is a logic system in which truth values of statements depend on the state and may vary
from state to state [14]. The most popular form of modal logic is temporal logic [15], wherein state transi-
tions represent the progression of time. Mobile ambients by Cardelli and Gordon [7] is a succinct formal
language for describing the movement of processes and devices through space and time. In the world of
mobile ambients, space is hierarchically structured and its structure may evolve as the time progresses. In
[3], Cardelli and Gordon proposed a modal logics having both time and space modalities for specifying
properties of mobile ambients.
Cloud conﬁguration logic (C2L) is a typed spatio-temporal logic whose syntax is loosely based on
Cardelli and Gordon’s modal logic [3] for mobile ambients [7]. The formal syntax of C2L statements is
given in Figure 2. There are a number of diﬀerences between mobile ambient logic and C2L:
1. Formulae in the mobile ambient logic are essentially statements about mobile ambient processes that
deﬁne inﬁnite structures, whereas C2L formulae are direct statements about dynamically evolving
typed ﬁnite trees. A typed tree is one in which each node is assigned a unique type.
2. The temporal fragment of mobile ambient logic is branching time whereas the temporal fragment of
C2L is linear time (interpreted over a single linear trace of cloud conﬁgurations). Moreover, C2L has
only past operators since C2L is used to specify properties of cloud conﬁguration histories rather than
that of fully speciﬁed transition structures.
3. Our quantiﬁcations are typed whereas mobile ambient logic uses untyped quantiﬁcations over all
possible names. An important diﬀerence is our use of types parameterized on values for quantiﬁcation
(i.e., dependent types [16]) . This allows us to specify attributes of the nodes as part of the type





F ∨ G disjunction
F ∧ G conjunction
F =⇒ G implication
F F holds in some past stateF F holds in the previous state
F F holds in all past states
m:T [F] F holds under node m of type T. Type T is optional (i.e,. m[F] is valid syntax).F F holds at some node under this node
(∀X:T ) F F holds at all nodes of type T under this node
(∃X:T ) F F holds at some node of type T under this node
Fig. 2. Cloud Conﬁguration Logic (C2L)
Notes on Syntax. The logical operators have their standard meaning. Note that the operator always in the
past () refers to the current state as well as all past states. Universal and existential quantiﬁcations are used
to enumerate and examine properties of all nodes of the speciﬁed type that exist under the given node, i.e.,
they quantify over the entire subtree and not simply over the set of immediate child nodes. This is one of the
key reasons for the expressivity of C2L. We use X, Y , Z for quantiﬁed variables. Quantiﬁed types can contain
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values from other quantiﬁed variables, making them dependent types [16]. This allows enumeration of nodes
resulting from a quantiﬁcation to be speciﬁc. Quantiﬁed types can also be enumerated types, which is useful
when used with dependent node types. For instance, the formula: (∃N:0..4) (∃V:VM{security = N})F uses
the variable N having enumerated type in the dependent type expression VM{security=N}.
Sometimes we wish to simply state that a node occurs in a certain spatial context. We may state that
node m occurs using the notation m[], and that node m of type T occurs by m :T []. Alternatively, to
state that node m does not occur, we may negate the previous proposition as ¬m[]. To state that a node m
occurs somewhere in the child subtree of n, we may specify [nm[]]. We may abbreviate this by [nm[]].
Using this notation, in order to specify that somewhere there occurs a node of type T, the formula would be:
(∃X:T ) X[]. Similarly, to specify that nowhere there occurs a node of type T, we may state ¬(∃X:T ) X[].
Spatial colocation of nodes can be expressed using conjunction. For instance, we may state that two nodes of
types T1 and T2 occur as siblings somewhere (i.e., are spatially colocated) as (∃X:T1) (∃Y:T2) (X[] ∧ Y[]).
In order to illustrate the syntax and examine the expressivity of the language, we present the sample
policy statements of Section 2 speciﬁed using C2L:
1. Company c1’s and c2’s VMs must never be colocated (we abbreviate V1[] and V2[] by V1[] and
V2[] respectively).
• ¬((∃V1:VM{co = c1}) (∃V2:VM{co = c2}) (V1[] ∧ V2[]))
2. Company c1’s VM must never get hosted in region A.
• ¬(regA[(∃V:VM{co = c1}) V[])
3. Company c1’s VMs must be hosted in at least two availability zones.
• ((∃A:Zone) A[(∃V:VM{co = c1})V[]] ∧ (∃B:Zone) B[(∃V ′:VM{co = c1})V ′[]]∧¬(A =
B))
4. Security level of VMs must match that of the zones.
• (∃N:0..3) (∀A:Zone{security = N}) A[(∀V:VM) V:VM{security = N}[]]
5. All regions must have a high-availability zone.
• (∀R:Reg) R[(∃A : Zone{ha = true}) A[]]
6. All zones in region regA must have at least one VM of company c1.
• regA[(∀Z:Zone) Z[(∃V:VM{co = c1}) V[]]]
7. VMs must not be migrated across regions.
• (∀V:VM) (∃R:Region) R[V[]] ∧ ((∃R′:Region) R′[V[]] =⇒ R = R′)
Owing to page limitations, we brieﬂy outline the main ideas behind developing a formal semantics for
C2L instead of presenting a full formal semantics of the language. Temporal transition structures typically
act as the semantic models for the various temporal logics. Since C2L is a spatio-temporal logic, the semantic
models for C2L must have both spatial as well as temporal information contained in them. Such a structure
can be deﬁned using the following components: (a) a set of states or nodes; (b) a temporal transition function
(since we are considering only a linear trace) that describes how the nodes evolve with time; (c) a spatial
transition relation that describes conﬁguration trees at each instance of time; (d) a typing and a naming
function that attaches type and name information to each node.
4. Policy Enforcement
In order to enforce C2L we need to maintain the history (trace) of cloud conﬁgurations and check whether
this dynamically generated trace satisﬁes the C2L statements. For this purpose, we make use of a cloud
conﬁguration history. A summary of the conﬁguration history for a fragment of the cloud conﬁguration
from Figure 1 is given in Figure 3. Each node maintains a list of its child nodes as well as a previous link,
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Fig. 3. Cloud conﬁguration history list.
which refers to the node’s immediate previous state in history. By traversing previous links we may navigate
through a node’s past history.
In order to enforce C2L policy statements, we present an algorithm that veriﬁes whether a conﬁguration
tree and its associated history states (obtained by traversing previous links) satisﬁes a C2L formula. Before
a conﬁguration change is committed it is checked using the verify algorithm given below and commitment
takes place, i.e., the change is actually implemented in the cloud, only if the verify algorithm returns true.
The algorithm recursively descends through the sub-formulae, examining one logical operator at a time. In
order to verify whether a cloud conﬁguration history satisﬁes a C2L formula, we call verifywith the top-level
node of the conﬁguration tree as the ﬁrst argument and the C2L formula as the second argument.
verify(node, ) = true
verify(null, F) = true
verify(null, F) = false, if F   ∧ ¬(∃F1)F = F1
verify(node, ¬ F) = not verify(node, F)
verify(node, F ∨ G) = verify(node, F) || verify(node, G)
verify(node, F ∧ G) = verify(node, F) && verify(node, G)
verify(node, F =⇒ G) = not verify(node, F) || verify(node, G)
verify(node,  F) = verify(node.prev, F)
verify(node,  F) = verify(node, F) || verify(node.prev,  F)
verify(node,  F) = verify(node, F) && verify(node.prev,  F)
verify(node, m:T[H]) = false, if getChild(node,m,T) = null
verify(node, m:T[H]) = verify(C, H), if getChild(node,m,T) = C  null
verify(node, F) = verify(node,F) || (forsome C in childList(node)) verify(C, F)
verify(node, (∀ X:T) F) = verify all(node, (∀ X:T) F, valueList(T)), if isenum(T)
verify(node, (∀ X:T) F) = verify all(node, (∀ X:T) F, ﬁndByType(node,T)), if not isenum(T)
verify(node, (∃ X:T) F) = verify some(node, (∃ X:T) F, valueList(T)), if isenum(T)
verify(node, (∃ X:T) F) = verify some(node, (∃ X:T) F, ﬁndByType(node,T)), if not isenum(T)
verify all(node, (∀ X:T) F, List) = (forall Y in List) verify(node, F[X← Y.name])2
verify some(node, (∃ X:T) F, List) = (forsome Y in List) verify(node, F[X← Y.name])
The verify algorithm is presented in a pseudo-functional language with pattern matching along with two
list-iteration-based boolean predicates, ( f orall X in L) p(X) and ( f orsome Y in L) p(X), which return true
if all or some elements, respectively, of the list L are satisﬁed by the predicate p(X). We make use of the
substitution operation, F1[X ← F2], which returns a new formula in which all free occurrences of X in
formula F1 are substituted by formula F2. A few auxiliary functions are also used in the deﬁnition of verify
and they are brieﬂy described below:
2If Y is a constant of an enumerated type, then we assume that Y.name simply provides the value of the constant.
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• The function getChild(n,m,T) returns the child node of a node n with name m and type T . If the type
is empty, only the name m is used in the match.
• The function childList(n) returns the list of child nodes of a given node n, and the function valueList(T)
returns the list of constants of an enumerated type T .
• The function ﬁndByType(n,T) returns the set of descendent nodes of n whose type matches type T .
If T is a dependent type or has one or more attributes speciﬁed, ﬁndByType will also look up the
corresponding attribute-value pairs for the node matching the basic type and will return the node only
if the speciﬁed attribute-value pairs also match. In other words, ﬁndByType will return nodes having
type T or any of its subtypes.
Analysis and Discussion
A key reason for the expressivity of the C2L language is its ability to specify predicates that are able to
quantify over entire subtrees of nodes. This expressivity comes at a price since these subtrees need to be
searched for matching nodes during the veriﬁcation stage. Similarly, use of the temporal operators  and
 requires searching through the entire history of conﬁguration trees. Hence we refer to them as global
temporal operators.
We brieﬂy describe the worst-case time complexity for verifying a C2L formula φ. This running time
is expressed in terms of the number of nodes of the conﬁguration trees that are to be visited in order to
verify the formula. Let |φ| refer to the number of basic subformulae in φ, i.e., formulae without quantiﬁers,
temporal operators or logical connectives. Given a history of conﬁguration trees H, let l be the length of the
history and n be the number of nodes in the largest conﬁguration tree in H.
In the absence of quantiﬁers and global temporal operators, the worst-case execution time for verifying
φ is O(|φ| × n) because each of the |φ| subformulae could make use of the ‘somewhere’ () operator, which
in turn might require all n nodes of the conﬁguration tree to be searched.
Now consider a C2L formula with q quantiﬁers and g global temporal operators. The worst-case time
complexity would be obtained when all the quantiﬁers are ‘∀’ and all the global temporal operators are
‘’ and they occur outermost in the formula: (...(∀...)(...(...(∀...F)))), where there are g occurrences of
, q occurrences of ∀, and F has no quantiﬁers or temporal operators. Each  operator would necessitate
searching through all l trees in the history H, and the nesting of g ‘always’ operators would require lg
visitations of the conﬁguration trees. Each visitation of a conﬁguration tree by a (∀...) requires traversal of n
nodes in the tree, and the nesting of q quantiﬁers requires nq nodes to be visited. Thus, the total worst-case
time complexity is O(lg × nq × n × |φ|) = O(lg × n(q+1) × |φ|).
The above running time is polynomially-bounded with respect to the size of the conﬁguration history,
if the number of quantiﬁers and global temporal operators in the formula are considered to be bounded
by some constant. However, with respect to number of the quantiﬁers and global temporal operators, the
running time grows exponentially. Logical equivalences such as F ⇐⇒ F can be used to reduce the
nesting of global temporal operators.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a formal language, namely C2L, for specifying cloud conﬁguration policies. The
language is essentially a spatio-temporal modal logic that assumes a hierarchically arranged spatial con-
ﬁguration that is found in cloud systems. We examined the expressivity of the language by specifying a
sample set of policy statements in the language. We have presented and analyzed an algorithm for verifying
the policy against cloud conﬁgurations. The algorithm and the examples show the practical utility of the
language for specifying cloud conﬁguration policies.
Similar to other standard temporal logics, C2L supports only a qualitative notion of time; it does not
provide a quantitative notion of time. Therefore we cannot directly express properties based on timestamps
as well as time intervals in C2L. For instance, we cannot directly state the following in C2L: A VM must be
kept in the high availability zone for at least k hours. Although some of the expressivity in this direction can
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be recovered using clever use of attributes, such formulae are likely to be complex and ineﬃcient to verify.
The C2L language also does not include aggregrate operations, such as min, max, count, etc., and hence we
cannot specify properties such as: A machine cannot host more than k VMs.
We intend to investigate optimized versions of the veriﬁcation algorithm presented in this paper that can
incrementally verify policy statements. We also intend to implement the policy language and its veriﬁcation
engine on a widely available cloud platform such as Eucalyptus (http://open.eucalyptus.com).
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